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Abstract—This article presents an information system for
location-based routing protocols that does not compromise the
privacy of the involved nodes. This information system provides
a representational model of the most frequented locations of
a node, this most frequented zone is called its habitat, and a
protocol to compare these habitats among nodes given a target
location of interest. Then, the protocol can determine which of
the neighbors of a node is nearer or farther from this target
location and provides this information to the underlying routing
protocol. As it is designed for DTNs, the protocol does not require
a trusted third party, instead, it implements a secure multi-party
computation based on homomorphic encryption. The protocol is
demonstrated to be secure against passive and active adversaries.
Index Terms—Secure multi-party computation, Delay and
Disruption Tolerant Network, DTN routing protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Delay and Disruption Tolerant Network (DTN) [7]
architecture emerged from the research for developing an
interplanetary network. This research was focused in solving
the technical difficulties found in out of space networking, p.e.
frequent disconnections or slow network links. But as these
characteristics could also be found in some scenarios on the
Earth, the DTN term was coined in order to include them.
One of the most important challenges that DTNs have
to face because of its characteristics is how to perform the
routing of messages [16]. The differences between DTNs
and traditional networks, such as the lack of an end-to-end
circuit between the source and the destination or the fact
that nodes can not have a global knowledge of the network
due to their disconnected nature, make the routing protocols
used in traditional networks ineffective. To overcome this,
some routing protocols for DTNs generate metrics that model
the behavior of the nodes in the network. Then, with the
information provided by the model, the routing protocol can
make substantiated decisions on how to forward the messages
in order to try to maximize the delivery rate.
This paper presents an information system support for
location-based routing protocols. This information system is
composed of a representation model of the most frequented
locations of a node and a protocol for determining, given n
nodes, which of their habitats is nearer or farther of a target
location.
This information support would allow a location-based
routing protocol the maximization of the delivery rate of the
messages by forwarding them to the nodes nearer to the
destination location of the given message. Or it would also
allow a routing protocol to forward the messages by paths
that try to avoid specific zones by sending the messages to
the nodes farther of these zones.
To implement the protocol would seem logical to think
that the coordinates of the target location could be directly
compared to the habitats of the nodes. But the privacy of
the involved nodes must be taken into account, since this
nodes could identify physical persons and revealing its location
could be a threat and an invasion of their privacy. Therefore,
the habitats comparisons are treated as a secure multi-party
computation [13].
There are several solutions for performing a secure multi-
party computation. The ones originally proposed by [9] and
[15], and extended by many others, make use of a combinato-
rial circuit for representing the required computation. Parties
execute then a short protocol for every gate of the circuit. The
advantage of these approaches is that they are general methods,
but the problem is that the protocol depends on the size of the
circuit. Therefore, for complex computations these protocols
can be inefficient. Other approaches, like the ones proposed by
[17] or [2], design specific protocols based on, for example,
homomorphic encryption or 1-out-of-N oblivious transfers, to
solve specific problems. These solutions are more efficient,
but are limited to the solving of these specific problems.
The proposal in this paper uses a specific secure multi-party
computation based on homomorphic encryption for efficiency
reasons.
II. HABITAT
This section first describes what is and how is represented
an habitat. Then, it shows how the habitats of two nodes con
be compared given a target location. And finally, shows how
is calculated the distance between two points.
A. Description
The habitat of a node represents its most frequented loca-
tions and it is represented by a dynamically created ellipse
from the historic of movement of the node. How is the ellipse
created is not contemplated in this article. An ellipse can be
defined as
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Definition 1. The set of points such that the sum of the
distances to two fixed points, the foci, is constant. This distance
defines the radius of the ellipse.
Hence, an habitat is defined with two foci points F1 :
(f1x, f1y) and F2 : (f2x, f2y) and a radius r.
B. Comparison
When comparing the habitats of two nodes, three different
situation may be found:
1) The target location is outside the two habitats. In this case
the one nearer to the target is preferred.
2) The target location is inside the two habitats. In this case
the node with the smallest habitat is preferred, as it is
more probable that the node pass through this location
earlier.
3) The target location is inside one of the habitats but outside
the other. In this case the preferred node is the one with
the target location inside its habitat.
To solve each one of the previous situations, it is necessary
to solve the following three problems:
1) How to calculate the distance from an habitat to a target
location.
2) Given two habitats, how to determine which one is
smaller.
3) How to determine if the target location is inside an
habitat.
1) Distance from a target location to an habitat: It is neces-
sary to calculate the distance from the target location defined
by a point P : (x, y) to an habitat H , determined by the
ellipse with foci points F1 : (f1x, f1y) and F2 : (f2x, f2y)
and radius r.
First, it is defined the point X : (a, b) as the nearest point
of the habitat H to the point P , so it would need to comply
the next equation
|a− f1x|+ |b− f1y|+ |a− f2x|+ |b− f2y| = r (1)
Then, it is defined the function distance as follows
d(X,P ) = |a− x|+ |y − b| (2)
and it is minimized while restricted by equation 1, for
example with the method of Lagrange multipliers, to get the
point X . Finally, to obtain the distance is applied the function
distance 2 with the point X and P .
2) Which habitat is smaller: To know which habitat is
smaller, are compared the radius of the two habitats. Given
two habitats H1 and H2, with radius r1 and r2 respectively,
the one with the smallest radius is the smallest habitat
r1 < r2 =⇒ H1
r2 < r1 =⇒ H2
(3)
3) Point inside an habitat: This problem can be resolved
as the first one. If the distance obtained is negative or 0, then
the point is inside the habitat.
C. Manhattan Geometry
To simplify the previous calculations it is used the def-
inition of distance that Manhattan Geometry [5] provides.
In Manhattan Geometry the function distance of two points





|pi − qi| (4)
where p and q are two points. This way it is simpler to calcu-
late the distance while still can be compared, as it maintains
the proportions. This simplification will be of interest when
calculating the distance in the secure multi-party computation
as the operations that can be performed will be limited by the
use of homomorphic encryption,
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOL FOR HABITAT
COMPARISONS
In this section first will be described how the problems for
comparing two habitats, described in section II, are solved
such that the privacy of the involved nodes remains unaffected.
Then, it will be showed how the protocol works for determin-
ing, given n nodes, which one, or ones, are nearer or farther
to the target location. The protocol will implement a secure
multi-party computation based on homomorphic encryption to
perform the calculations needed to compare the habitats of the
nodes.
A. Homomorphic encryption
An encryption scheme is considered homomorphic if given
the set of plain-texts M, the set of the cypher-texts C and the
encryption function E , it satisfies
∀m1,m2 ∈M, E(m1 M m2))← E(m1)C E(m2) (5)
for some operators M in M and C in C [8]. If the
encryption scheme only satisfies this property for one oper-
ation, e.g. multiplication or addition, it is considered partially
homomorphic.
For this protocol are used the homomorphic properties
of the cryptosystem proposed by P. Paillier in [11], known
as the Paillier cryptosystem. This cryptosystem is additively
homomorphic, computationally efficient and it allows the mul-
tiplication of cyphered-texts by unencrypted constants without
the need of decrypting the operands. Therefore, the set of
operations cryptographically protected that can be performed
are: sum, subtraction and multiplication of an encrypted value
by a non-encrypted constant.
B. Secure comparison
The use of homomorphic encryption limits the operations
that can be performed over the encrypted operands, therefore,
the previous comparison process needs to be adapted to
overcome these limitations.
The problem appears when the distance from an habitat
to a target location is calculated. To calculate the distance it
is necessary to first find the nearest point of the habitat to
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the target location and then use the found point to calculate
the distance, as described in II-B1. But if the operands are
encrypted under homomorphic encryption it is not possible to
calculate their absolute value, therefore this operation needs
to be disposed.
To do so, it is determined where is the target location
situated in relation of the habitat to make sure that all the
subtractions encode an absolute value.
If the space is divided into 9 regions, it can be de-
termined in which region is the target location calculat-
ing the maximum and minimum values of the foci points
(Fxmin, Fxmax, Fymin, Fymax) and comparing them with
the coordinates of P. Once it is known in which region is
situated the target location, the equations 1 and 2 can be
redefined without the need of calculating absolute values and
then minimized for each of the cases.
Note that the corner regions define b in terms of a. This is
the line where X is located, but not any point of this line is
the nearest to P . To know exactly where is the nearest point
each one of these regions is divided in two subregions. To do
so is calculated the left end LE and the right end RE of the
habitat and then compared with the target location. These two
ends are calculated with the following equations
LE = Fxmax + Fxmin + Fymax − Fymin − r
RE = Fxmax + Fxmin − Fymax + Fymin + r
(6)
If the point is located between LE and RE, X and P share
the x coordinate, so a = x, otherwise, b = Fymax in the two
superior corners and b = Fymin in the other two.
C. Protocol
To describe the protocol it is imagined an scenario where
A has multiple neighbors but only A can see all of them.
Given that this situation can be quite common, the proto-
col has been designed such that A will coordinate all the
messages. Therefore, the protocol is based in letting A have
the information that other nodes need to compare between
them so A can distribute it between the other nodes as it
requires. Obviously, as the privacy needs to be preserved,
this information is encrypted and only accessible by the node
referred.
The protocol is divided in two phases, which are represented
in figure 1. After the first phase, A has compared its own
habitat to the habitats of its neighbors. And during the second
phase the surviving nodes (the nodes that still satisfy the req-
uisites of A) are compared among them, under the commands
of A, until A decides that it has enough information for its
purposes.
The neighbor discovery is conducted with the transmission
and detection of periodically transmitted beacons. When a
node detects a beacon, if it has messages to forward, it sends a
beacon asking all the receiving nodes to announce its presence
so it can detect all the neighbor nodes at once. After a time
t1 has elapsed, the protocol continues.
Figure 1. State diagram of the proposed protocol
1) Phase one: Node A compare its habitat with the habitat
of another node following the exchange of messages described
in figure 2. A is the node that coordinates the protocol and B
any other neighbor.
Figure 2. Phase one: Exchange of messages to compare a given habitat and
a target location known by A with the habitat of other nodes
1 Node B sends the limits of its habitat together with its
presence beacon.
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• Node A subtracts to the limits the coordinates of the
target location so node B can determine in which region
is situated the target location respect its habitat. Note
that all the results are obfuscated, by multiplying them
by k, so node B can only know the situation of the
target location respect its habitat and not the exact
position of it.
2 Node A transmits the subtracted limits together with the
target location P : (x, y), its distance dA (which node A
has calculated without any restriction, as he knows the
target location an its habitat), and its radius rA.
• Node B calculates EA(dB) with the supplied target
locations, then, it creates the tuple described in the
figure. This is done this way to do not let node A
know if the distances are equal (or 0) as it will not
distinguish between the comparison of the distance and
the comparison of the radius.
3 Node B transmits the results to node A, and as node A
needs to have the required information so other nodes can
compare among them, node B includes with the result its
own habitat (F1, F2 and r), encrypted with its own key.
• To interpret the result node A checks the sign of the
two values of the tuple, if the values are 0 or positive,
node B is considered to be nearer than A to the target
location.
• With the habitat and knowing in which region is the
target location, node A can calculate the distance of
that node to it, although it is encrypted and unaccessi-
ble for itself. But as node A does not know the region
where is the target location situated, it calculates the
distance for each of the regions, so it ends having 13
different distances, one for each region and subregion.
Once the protocol finishes, node A knows if node B is nearer
or farther to the target location than itself, but it has not learned
anything about the habitat of node A. And on the other hand,
node B has not learned the target location, only the situation
of its habitat respect to this target location and has been able to
compare its habitat with the habitat of node A without learning
it.
If no nodes satisfy the requisites of node A, or only one
node satisfies them, the protocol ends. Otherwise, the protocol
continues with phase two.
2) Phase two: Phase two starts with node A knowing which
of its nodes satisfy its requisites, and having the distance of
the habitat to the destination target location of these nodes,
although the distance is encrypted and node A does not know
which of the 13 distances is the correct one.
At this point, node A has to determine which comparisons
need to be done to reach a decision. As a method to compare
the habitat of any two nodes is provided, any filtering or
sorting algorithm can be used. For example, if node A only
wants to know which node is the nearest to the target location,
A could just make all nodes compare randomly while discards
the ones that lose a comparison until only one node is left.
Or if A wants to sort all its neighbors from nearer to farther,
Figure 3. Phase two: Exchange of messages to compare the habitat of B
with the habitat of other nodes
it can perform a Quicksort ordering. This decision is beyond
the scope of this article.
To perform this comparisons node A starts the exchange
of messages shown in figure 3. Being node B the node to be
compared an O the others nodes to compare with B:
4 Node A sends to the other nodes the information that they
need to compare themselves with node B: the distances of
node B to the destination target location dB (13 of them,
one for each region and subregion), the target location
P : (x, y) and the radius rB of the habitat of node B. All
this values are encrypted with the key of B.
• This is the same information that they received from
node A in the first step of the protocol, with the
difference that it is encrypted by node B and that they
do not know which one is the correct distance, so they
need to compare for each one.
With this information they calculate their distance to
the target location again, but encrypted for node B, and
they subtract it to each of the dB provided.
5 The next step requires opening the result of the compar-
ison. Only node B can open the results, therefore, there
are two options:
• If they can see each other, they send the result directly
to node B,
• If they can not see each other, they send it to node A
so node A can forward it to node B.
Once node B has the result, it opens the correct one.
6 Finally, node B transmits the interpreted results to node
A.
This comparisons can be done in both ways, therefore, if
node A does not completely trust node B it can ask node B to
compare itself with the other nodes and only accept the results
that match.
D. Performance
The information transfered by the protocol can be calculated
with the following formula, b is the size of each value, m is the
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number of messages ready to be forwared by a given node and
c is the number of comparisons performed in the phase two
(which number will depend of the chosen sorting algorithm):
12 ∗ b+ 11 ∗ b ∗m+ (17 ∗ b ∗m+ 2 ∗ b) ∗ c
The size of each value will depend on the key used to encrypt
them, being them twice the size of the key.
It is safe to assume that most DTNs have a window time
of at least a few seconds, for example [4] and [12], and a
bandwidth in the order of, at least, the hundreds of kilobytes
per second, thus, the overhead of the protocol would not
impact on the performance of the network.
Regarding computation performance, it will depend on the
hardware of the nodes, but as the operations to encrypt and
decrypt of the Paillier cryptosystem have low complexity, it is
feasible to implement the protocol in any moderately powerful
hardware.
Finally, note that this information system is designed to
complement other routing protocols, therefore it should be
used when its use is expected to improve the delivery ratio
of the messages.
IV. SECURITY DISCUSSION
The global security of the proposed protocol is not deter-
mined by the individual behavior of the nodes, therefore, the
security rests in three main points: the Paillier cryptosystem,
the key management and the control of the information indi-
rectly disclosed. The security of the first two points can be
quickly determined: The Paillier cryptosystem is proved to be
robust and secure [11] and the security of the key management
is responsibility of the node as the keys are never transmitted
during the protocol. More interesting is the analysis of the
information disclosed.
To analyze the information disclosed by the execution of the
protocol, the framework defined in [6] for the analysis of the
security of multi-party computations will be used as starting
point. This framework describes different adversary models
and gives a generalization of the concept of ideal process,
already proposed by other authors in [10] and [3].
In this framework a protocol is considered to securely
perform a given task if executing the real protocol amounts
to “emulating” the ideal process for that task. In the ideal
process there is an incorruptible trusted party who receives the
inputs of all the parties, locally computes the desired outputs
and transmits them to the required parties. To define what
is “emulating”, first is necessary to formalize the output of
performing a given task.
The output is formalized as the information that the task
explicitly outputs in addition of what can be inferred. In other
words, the information the task outputs once it has successfully
finished and the information that can be deduced from the
process of performing the task.
Now, emulating a task is performing it in such a way that its
output is exactly the same as the ideal task. Thus, all parties
will learn identical information from both the real protocol
and the ideal process.
The adversaries covered in this analysis are classified in
passive and active adversaries. Passive adversaries, also called,
semi-honest, only gather information and do not modify the
behavior of the parties. On the other hand active adversaries,
also called “Byzantine”, modify the outputs of the function so
they can corrupt other parties to get more information.
To simplify the study of the security of the proposed
protocol, it will be divided in two subtask. The subtask of
comparing the habitats of two nodes when one of them knows
the target location, and the subtask of comparing a given
habitat and a target location to n other nodes. The first subtask
corresponds to the first phase of the protocol, and the second
subtask to the second phase. These phases are described in
section III. Also, it will be distinguished between the security
of the nodes (the privacy of their habitats) and the security of
the target location (as it can be the location of a node).
The analysis will be performed as follows. For each subtask
and adversary, it will be described the output of performing
the subtask in the ideal process and then it will be compared
with the output of performing the same subtask in the real
protocol.
A. One-to-one habitat comparison subtask
In the step one of the protocol it is performed a comparison
between the habitats of two nodes, one of them knowing
the target destination. Then, the task of this subtask is the
determination, between these two habitats, of which one is
better suited to forward a message to this destination. The
nodes will be called A and B, being A the one with the
message to forward.
To perform the ideal process of this task, A would send
its habitat and the target location P to the trusted third party
using a secure channel and B its own habitat with another
secure channel. The output that the trusted third party would
transmit would be the communication to the A of which of the
habitats is considered better. Therefore, A would not learn any
additional information about the habitat of B and B would not
learn anything about the habitat of A nor the target location.
Now, will be show how this subtask behaves against passive
and security adversaries.
1) Passive adversaries: The execution of the ideal process
in presence of passive adversaries would not lead to any oppor-
tunity for them to gather additional information. Otherwise, the
real protocol reveals to B the region where the target location
P is located regarding its habitat.
The revelation of the region is the only difference between
the ideal process and the real protocol, but if it points to a node
this is not a threat to its privacy as its location can be hidden
by breaking the relation between the target location and the
node, p.e. with the technique used in [14]. Therefore it can be
stated that this part of the protocol does not compromise the
security of the forwarding nodes nor the nodes to which the
target location can refer in presence of passive adversaries.
2) Active adversaries: In the ideal process, the active
adversaries can only modify the inputs sent to the trusted third
party, on the other hand, in the real protocol, both A and B
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can modify the values in the intermediate steps of the protocol
to try to corrupt the other node.
If the modified values were the values operated with the
encrypted data, the consequences would be the same than
modifying the original inputs. Thus, this modifications would
not affect the security of the protocol as it has been defined
because this attacks could be also performed in the ideal
process. In addition, no other alterations can be done that
would give any advantage to the adversary as all the values are
encrypted and any modification to these values would produce
random uncontrolled outputs when decrypted.
Hence, it is possible to state that this part of the protocol is
also secure against active adversaries as it does not compro-
mise the security of the nodes not of the target location.
B. One-to-N habitat comparison subtask
The other subtask is the comparison of a given habitat
among other n nodes. The task is determining which one or
which ones, depending the sorting or filtering process used,
fulfill the requirements of the initiator of the protocol. It starts
at the last step of the first phase of the protocol, when the node
gives, together with the result of the comparison, its encrypted
habitat. This subtask performs the part of the protocol used in
the previous subtask but with different parties, then, only the
differences from the previous subtask need to be discussed.
To perform this subtask in the ideal model, all the nodes
would send its habitat to the trusted third party, and the node
A, in addition, would send the target location P . Now, the
trusted third party would perform the required calculations
and would send the results of these comparisons to the node
A.
The main difference from the previous subtask is that node
A is allowed to have the information regarding the habitat of
another node, but it is not able to access to it as it is encrypted.
Then, once node A has calculated the distance of the target
node using its habitat information, the protocol behaves in
the same way than in the first subtask and no additional
information is disclosed.
Therefore, as if node A has the information of another node
does not affect the security of the protocol it is possible to
assume that this subtask is also secure against passive and
active adversaries. Thus, the whole protocol is considered
secure against active and passive adversaries.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article we have proposed a support information
system for location-based routing protocols that does not
compromise the privacy of the involved nodes. This system
allows the nodes to use geographical information to make
routing decisions. With the proposed system, it is possible to
forward the messages in such a way that they take a specific
path. For example, the messages can be sent as directly as
possible to their destination, avoiding specific areas. . .
All the required calculations are securely performed on the
involved nodes while protected by the homomorphic Paillier
cryptosystem. Then, since no trusted third parties are needed,
this protocol is suitable for DTNs.
These calculations can be considered a specific case of a
secure multi-party computation. Hence, the security of the
protocol has been analyzed from this point of view. This
analysis has concluded that the protocol is secure against
passive and active adversaries, including collusion attacks.
As future work, it would be interesting to implement the
proposed information system, e.g. in the aDTN platform
currently developed by the SeNDA research group [1]. This
platform allows the exchange of messages following the store-
carry-process-and-forward paradigm proposed in [4] which
allows the messages to provide their own routing code. Then,
it would be of interest to develop several routing algorithms
that make use of this information system and compare the
performance of these routing algorithms to other routing
protocols.
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